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Decision-Making in
Mental Health Law: Can
Past Experience Predict
Future Practice?
Jill Peay1
Introduction
The short answer to this is no. Whilst it may be possible to be certain about the occurrence of
some events, the prediction of decision-making requires caution and qualification. Yet past
practice can be a good guide to making informed guesses about the future. Accordingly, this article
addresses the question of whether what we know about how practitioners make decisions in
respect of current mental health law can help us to understand how the government’s latest
proposals for reforming mental health law are likely to fare. Two main issues are discussed: first,
the nature of the proposed criteria; and second, the nature of the process, who will get involved
with whom? The article concludes with some miscellaneous observations and engages in some
autopoietically inspired kite-flying. 
Before embarking on this a few words of warning are necessary. Nothing that follows is rocket
science (or as rocket scientists say, quantum physics).2 It is based on what practitioners have said
honestly and frankly about their own problems in applying the current legislation. And the
problems that they have encountered are not exceptional. It is commonplace for many of our
decisions to be based on fear, uncertainty and occasionally, frank ignorance. Moreover, lawyers are
not an exception to the rule. As Lady Hale has observed ‘lawyers might be clearer about the legal
principles involved, but they would still be torn about how to fit the perceived needs of the
individual case into the prescribed legal framework’.3 Finally, what people say they do, and say they
have done, is not always wholly consistent with their practice. In this context, predicting what they
will do is hazardous.
1 Dr. Jill Peay, Reader in Law, London School of
Economics. This article was presented first to the 2nd
North East Mental Health Law Conference organised
by Northumbria University Law School and Eversheds
(solicitors) in November 2004. I am grateful for the
comments I received then and latterly to my colleagues
Richard Nobles and David Schiff. Any
misunderstandings that remain of the relevance of
autopoietic theory are entirely of my own making.
2 Perkins, E. (2002), Decision-Making in Mental
Health Review Tribunals London: Policy Studies
Institute; Peay, J. (1981), ‘Mental Health Review
Tribunals: Just or Efficacious Safeguards?’ Law and
Human Behavior 5, 2/3, 161–186; Peay, J. (1989),
Tribunals on Trial: A Study of Decision Making
Under the Mental Health Act 1983. Oxford: Oxford
University Press; Bryson B. (2003) A Short History of
Nearly Everything London: Random House
3 In Peay, J (2003) Decisions and Dilemmas: Working with
Mental Health Law Oxford: Hart Publishing at page v.
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The Draft Mental Health Bill 2004 underwent detailed examination by the Joint Scrutiny
Committee (JSC).4 Their report was published in March 2005. This article is based on the
proposals as set out in the Bill as it was first published in September 2004. There are a number of
features in this that I welcome. This is not surprising since these features stem largely from the
recommendations of the Richardson Committee: for example, the single gateway to compulsory
power, early intervention by an independent decision-making body – the Tribunal – to approve an
agreed care plan, arrangements for advocacy and the nominated person proposals. There are some
features about which I am agnostic, being in support in principle but anxious about their practical
application; for example, the need for independent decision-making by doctors and an approved
mental health professional before compulsory assessment can take place with those decisions being
independently justified. However, I am anxious that these potentially welcome developments are
likely to be obviated by the practical application of the new Bill, since this will, in my view, extend
the boundaries of compulsion in a way that makes many aspects of the proposed legislation
unworkable. And then there are numerous features of the Bill that I find problematic. These
include consigning the limited and non-obligatory principles to the Code of Practice (which will
prove an unreliable sign-post for non-legal practitioners); new criteria for admission and treatment
which are broader in scope than even the existing criteria (which will act as a lobster pot in drawing
people into compulsion but making it conversely harder to escape from the pot of compulsion);
the use of compulsion in new settings (outside of hospital and without the natural restraint of the
requirement for a hospital bed); the introduction of more explicit obligations on professionals (see,
for example, clause 60) whilst reducing existing discretion (see, for example, the absence of an
overarching discretion on the tribunal to discharge in any circumstances); the need only to consult
and involve patients and nominated persons in decision-making; reliance on language which is
subjective ‘appropriate treatment must be available’ and value driven, relying on such terms as
‘warrant’, ‘expedient’ and ‘necessary’; and a Bill that runs to 307 clauses, 14 schedules, an
application which may be modified geographically (note, as ever, the Isles of Scilly in 307(7)) and
details as yet to be specified in Regulations and the Code of Practice. In short, a non-lawyer’s
nightmare and a lawyer’s paradise.5 The government has quaintly asserted that only people who
need compulsion will be subject to it (that is, compulsion won’t be used unnecessarily). It is not
clear on what basis this assertion is made.
Many of these problematic features arguably derive from the fundamental approach adopted by
the government, since it has chosen to justify the use of compulsion on grounds of necessity. In
so doing it has rejected the Richardson Committee’s approach, which was based on the principles
of autonomy and non-discrimination; an approach that would have resulted in some form of,
albeit attenuated, capacity based legislation.6 However, as Rosie Winterton has stated in defending
the government’s necessity based approach 
4 The proceedings of the Joint Scrutiny Committee (JSC)
on the Mental Health Bill can be found at:
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/jc
dmhb.cfm
5 The introduction of conspicuously unclear and complex
legislation that requires extensive judicial clarification
has attracted criticism before. In January 2005 Lord
Justice Rose, Vice President of the Court of Appeal’s
Criminal Division, observed that bringing the
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 into force
before appropriate training could be given obliged the
Court of Appeal to engage in ‘unsatisfactory activity,
wasteful of scare resources in public money and
judicial time’. See J.Rozenberg ‘Judge condemns new
jury ruling’ news.telegraph filed 15th January 2005.
6 G. Richardson (1999) Review of the Mental Health
Act 1983. Report of the Expert Committee, Presented
to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for
Health 15 July 1999, published November 1999 by the
Department of Health.
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‘we have concluded that existing mental health legislation relies on the only practicable basis
for compulsion to prevent harm. Whilst a capacity based system may suffice to protect people
from unnecessary intrusion, it is ineffective to prevent the harm to themselves or others which
may result from their disorder.’7
1. The Proposed Criteria and their Likely Application 
The government has proposed in Clause 9 of the Draft Mental Health Bill 2004 that the following
conditions should apply to the use of compulsion
9 The relevant conditions
(1) In this Part, references to the relevant conditions are to the following conditions (subject to subsection
(7)).
(2) The first condition is that the patient is suffering from mental disorder.
(3) The second condition is that that mental disorder is of such a nature or degree as to warrant the
provision of medical treatment to him.
(4) The third condition is that it is necessary –
(a) for the protection of the patient from –
(i) suicide or serious self-harm, or
(ii) serious neglect by him of his health or safety, or
(b) for the protection of other persons,
that medical treatment be provided to the patient.
(5) The fourth condition is that medical treatment cannot lawfully be provided to the patient without him
being subject to the provisions of this Part.
(6) The fifth condition is that medical treatment is available which is appropriate in the patient’s case,
taking into account the nature or degree of his mental disorder and all the other circumstances of his case.
(7) The fourth condition does not apply in the case of a patient aged 16 or over who is at substantial risk
of causing serious harm to other persons.
(8) For the purposes of this Part, a determination as to whether a patient is at substantial risk of causing
serious harm to other persons is to be treated as part of the determination as to whether all of the relevant
conditions appear to be or are met in his case.
A number of these terms will be familiar to those working with the Mental Health Act 1983, and
in that context, decision-making under that Act should provide some guide as to the interpretation
and application of these terms. I will be drawing for my observations and limited predictions
mainly on Decisions and Dilemmas: Working with Mental Health Law.8 This research involved 106
mental health practitioners, made up of s.12(2) approved psychiatrists, second opinion appointed
doctors (SOADs) and approved social workers (ASWs), who variously took part in three decision-
7 Memorandum from Rosie Winterton, Minister of
State, Department of Health (2004) Mental Health
Bill – Necessity vs Capacity submitted to the JSC
(DMH 396) and available on the JSC web site
(above). See also the responses to that memorandum by
Richardson (DMH 408) and Peay (DMH 407) on the
same site.
8 See Peay 2003 above
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making exercises. These required the practitioners to make decisions individually and as part of a
pair on the basis of extensive written and video-materials. Here is not the place to defend the
methodology, but it does enable me to make some observations about how non-lawyers perceive,
apply and justify their use of mental health law in respect of one of three decisions: to admit a
patient under compulsion, to discharge a patient or to give treatment without consent.
So, how are these criteria likely to be applied?
Do notions of uncertain risk promote use of compulsory powers?
The most striking aspect of the criteria is that they are imbued with notions of risk; this is not
surprising given the government’s form on this issue.9 The criteria will require practitioners to
assess whether action is necessary to prevent the future occurrence of harm; practitioners will have
further to make a prediction as to the level of harm that is thought likely to occur. Whilst self-harm
requires a high threshold to be passed (suicide or serious self-harm), harm to others is couched in
the most general language ‘the protection of others’. No indication is given as to the degree of
probability of this harm occurring. However, it is logical to infer that the degree of probability is
something less than a ‘substantial risk’, since clause 9(7) makes explicit reference to a substantial
risk when serious harm to others is entailed. Thus, ‘the protection of others’ in clause 9(4)(b) may
draw in any degree of physical, psychological or financial harm, or arguably even mere
perturbation to the well-being of others. Whilst it is hard enough to weigh known facts, weighing
the future is impossibly difficult. In those circumstances where mental health professionals are
currently required to make predictions about uncertain risk, their thinking and their decisions
were imbued with caution: thus, 
we are trying to make predictions in situations of uncertainty and in a sense we are bound to err on the
side of safety. In some ways it’s the only error we are permitted to make because we are expected to
protect individuals, and we are expected to protect the public. This is part of our overall responsibility
and if the balance is tipping towards increasing concerns, I don’t think we can put it aside.......not to
do something and wait to find out, well, we might find out what we don’t want to find out ASW, pair
17
In some ways I feel that the law gives you that little bit more support. Say he goes on a s.3, it does tighten
everything up. I don’t think it’s so bad to use the law and I’m not saying I don’t think twice about it.
There are times when I have put people on a section and I’ve thought gosh I’m depriving that person of
their liberty. It’s not something that you can take lightly. I think that I do use best interests all round. I
think now, almost all of us are so fearful to let things slip, it’s almost like you are saying, it’s in the best
interests for me as well because if this goes horribly wrong then I cop for it. I am the scapegoat. ASW,
pair 22
Interacting with one another, different kinds of uncertainty about the law, the possibility of future
harm and the obligation to protect ‘others’, combined to produce a situation that was potentially
full of dread; resort to the law provided a kind of prop. And whilst the law was not fully
9 See the government’s Draft Mental Health Bill 2002; and the preceding White Paper, Department of Health and Home
Office (2000) Reforming the Mental Health Act Part I: The New Legal Framework Cm 5016–1; Part II: High Risk
Patients Cm 501–II London: The Stationery Office Ltd; and the Green Paper, Department of Health (1999) Reform of
the Mental Health Act 1983. Proposals for Consultation. Cm 4480 London: The Stationery Office Ltd; and
commentary thereon, Peay, J. (2000), ‘Reform of the Mental Health Act 1983: Squandering an Opportunity?’, Journal
of Mental Health Law 5–15. 
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understood, it was sufficiently familiar to provide some element of comfort. In cases of doubt
therefore, there was an incentive to resort to the use of law. By introducing greater uncertainty and
lower thresholds for action in the face of risk, the Draft Bill looks likely to be used more, not less,
than the current Act.
The use of informal admission – avoiding the Act
Whilst there is an incentive to use the Act in cases of uncertainty, another theme that can be seen
in the decision-making of practitioners was to avoid using the 1983 Act where a desired result
could be achieved informally. It is hard to predict quite where the resolution of the problem posed
by Bournewood patients (the compliant but incapacitous patient) will ultimately fall,10 but
historically the bulk of these patients have not been admitted under section. The research findings
illustrated the thinking that sometimes lay behind these decisions: pair 37 would have taken the
patient, Mr Draper, into hospital informally where he assented to admission, informally for a ‘rest’,
informally even if he was very deluded (although here the psychiatrist would have wanted to
section) and would have accommodated coerced informal admission, that is in circumstances
where they knew that his consent to admission was given in order to avoid being taken into
hospital under section. Thus,
if he is willing to hold his hand out and say I’ll come in for a rest, then it would achieve most of my
objectives, at least in terms of keeping him safe and keeping his neighbours safe and I would be prepared
to settle for that in the first instance, knowing full well that if he changes his mind, after whatever
length of time it takes us to make our assessment, to take a decision about what we want to do in
treatment terms. The options are still open to us at that stage to do something ... ASW, pair 37
This approach is not uncommon, and is supported by the statistics on the use of coercion in
hospital; that is, of patients who enter hospital either by consent or informally, who subsequently
find themselves subject to section. To illustrate, in 2002–3 there were 25,112 compulsory
admissions under Part II of the 1983 Act and 18,611 conversions of voluntary/informal patients
to compulsory status in hospital.11 In short 43% of the uses of compulsion under Part II occurred
with patients already in hospital. And, as Bindman and his colleagues have suggested, the use
compulsory sections in hospital may take place more readily where staff have acquired a sense of
responsibility for patients as a result of their prior voluntary/informal admission.12
Of course, not all practitioners responded in the same way to a patient showing clear signs of
incapacity in the context of compliance. For some, the ethical dilemmas involved were
acknowledged:
I don’t think it is satisfactory... It is not very fair on the in-patient nursing staff either, because you are
really just transferring the responsibility of making the decision to them. Psychiatrist, pair 26
10 The government clearly needs to address the breaches of
Article 5 set out by the European Court of Human
Rights in HL v UK October 2004, but they have
seemed uncertain as to whether the remedy is best
addressed under a new Mental Health Act or under
the new Mental Capacity Act; see, for example,
Department of Health (2005) Interface between the
Draft Mental Health Bill and the Mental Capacity
Bill (DMH 405) available on the JSC web site above.
11 Department of Health (2003) Statistical Bulletin: In-
patients formally detained in hospitals under the
Mental Health Act 1983 and other legislation
2002–03. London: Department of Health and
National Statistics, Statistics Division 2.
12 J. Bindman, Y. Reid, G. Thornicroft, G. Szmukler and
J.Tiller (2001) A Study of Experiences of Hospital
Admission. London: Report of a Study Commissioned
by the Department of Health Research and
Development Division
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This psychiatrist would also have used the compulsory provisions for admission where the
patient’s agreement to admission occurred after some mention of the 1983 Act 
otherwise he is not really coming in informally, he is coming in under duress. 
Others were more influenced by resources issues. For example, the ASW in pair 35, who used
informal admission liberally, observed: 
If you have a view of the mental health services as excellent services then those who can be persuaded
will be persuaded and those who can’t because they are deluded can come in informally anyway. I’m not
certain in what context you’d want to use the Mental Health Act because the safeguards become almost
redundant if you have a very positive view of mental health services. ASW, pair 35
Where a practitioner’s view of mental health services is not so positive, resort to compulsion may
be more likely. As the Rethink Report has questioned, is it the inadequacy of community mental
health services or the bleakness and squalor of acute wards that makes voluntary admission less
likely and compulsion more likely.13 What cannot be denied is that there has been an increase in
the use of compulsion of nearly 30% in the last decade.14 Again, it is not clear how clause 9(5) will
be interpreted (that medical treatment cannot lawfully be provided to the patient without him being
subject to the provisions of this Part) in the context of a pre-existing Mental Capacity Act that
provides for lawful medical treatment of those lacking capacity, even if some use of restraint is
entailed.
Complex criteria – conflating the issues
Another issue concerns how practitioners use complex legal criteria, criteria that may need to be
independently satisfied. That non-legal practitioners may use the law in novel ways, ways not
anticipated by the legislature, was evident from the research. Thus, the phenomenon of conflation
across all of the criteria for admission could be seen. 
I’ve got three parameters here. I’ve got nature or degree and I’ve got risk and any one of them can add
points onto the score to take me up to my threshold. There has got to be a bit of illness, but if the risks
are getting higher, the risks of me not engaging with this man and leaving it are becoming unacceptable.
I then have to decide right, if this man is not safe out there where does he need to be? Does he need to
be in hospital or does he need to be in custody? ... If he’s not ill then it would be the police. If I am a
bit more towards ill then I’d probably go for hospital. With history, I’d go for illness, just because of his
history ... because the Act is couched in such non-specific terms, isn’t it? That’s all we can do. It does
have the potential to be misused. Psychiatrist, pair 14
Yet even this ‘graphic equaliser’ approach would suggest that for some practitioners a pure form of
preventive detention (that is, in the absence of illness) would not be acceptable. How practitioners
will respond to the proposal under Clause 9(7) that patients with a mental disorder of a nature or
degree warranting medical treatment who are at substantial risk of causing serious harm to other
persons cannot be treated on a voluntary basis is not clear. 
13 Rethink (2004:7) Behind Closed Doors: Acute Mental
Health Care in the UK London: Rethink
14 See Department of Health 2003 above
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A pragmatic approach?
Of course, some risks are more pressing than others. And not all risk is related to some underlying
abnormality. What should happen where a potential patient has no history of offending, but is
making threats? Where the risk is one that is merely predicted, practitioners recognised that there
was greater difficulty. As one ASW put it:
I think you’d have to look at that very carefully, because people make threats to other people and indeed
carry them out and it has absolutely nothing to do with them being mentally ill. So, is this an issue
perhaps for the police if he is making those kinds of threats under the influence of drinking...or is this
about somebody who is relapsing into a psychotic illness and acting under some kind of delusion or
hallucination in some way? ASW, pair 14
The research study illustrates well how, through experience, decision-makers tend to learn the rules
of the game and make their decisions in the light of all of the factors that they might be required
to consider. Constraining themselves to use only those that legitimately apply to the particular
facts of a given case was more problematic. 
Will the new tribunal make a difference?
Another reason why some practitioners used the current Act was because it provided patients with
a formal safeguard against the abuse of compulsion. To some, this was a comfort.
I don’t feel comfortable about section 3 being renewed, but, it may be what we need to do, so that he has
got some rights while he is in hospital to call a tribunal which he wouldn’t have as an informal patient.
It also gives us powers if we do find somewhere that he can go on leave, but we can recall him as and
when necessary. ASW, pair 17
However, it is self-evident that if the new Tribunal is to have no discretionary power to discharge
and will apply the same broad criteria used to justify assessment and treatment, then there is little
prospect of it acting to remedy the inappropriate use of compulsion, for there will be little bite in
the criteria it is obliged to apply. On the other hand, this situation may not be so different from
that as currently envisaged by some practitioners, who clearly took the view that tribunals are as
‘realistic’ in their application of the law as were practitioners. Difficult choices resulted in
pragmatic solutions by all concerned. 
Hopefully, it’s morally defensible. Yes, I must say that in my experience I think the tribunal will probably
uphold, whether or not they are right in doing it in law I don’t know, but I think they probably use the
same line of reasoning as us – this is a chap who is a pretty serious risk and he needs to be closely
supervised – and perhaps one would hope that they might not be so strict about the rigid letter of the
law. I don’t know. Psychiatrist, pair 35
For some who took part in the research the conflict between their ethics and a pragmatic solution
was all too apparent, but this conflict could be resolved by adopting a cautious approach (when
considering renewal of a section).
I think ethically the more justifiable thing would be not to renew it and to say the problem is one of
resources, not one which can be solved with the use of the Mental Health Act. I’ve been at a tribunal
where a patient of mine was discharged on the basis that the tribunal felt she could be managed at home
safely providing there was a community psychiatric nurse visiting twice a day over a period of two or
three weeks. We endeavoured to do this in that individual case by withdrawing resources from other
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clients, so in the end it was an economic decision which probably is possible in theory. Taking each case
in isolation so you could manage a lot of people at home if you could put in sufficient resources. But if
you can’t, then the safest option is to detain. ... I might be inclined to renew with misgivings.
Psychiatrist, pair 36
Will compulsory community treatment be over-used?
Moving patients seamlessly from compulsion in hospital to compulsion in the community is likely
to prove attractive to those practitioners who are understandably cautious about tolerating risk.
There was evidence from the research that practitioners were fully prepared to renew a section
solely in order to ensure that a patient could be moved from hospital into some community setting
on s.17 leave where medication could still be administered under compulsion and the patient could
be returned to hospital if matters deteriorated (or the practitioner’s ability to tolerate risk
changed).15 Thus: 
It seems a shame that one is having to renew a section 3 just to allow a period of leave of absence down
the line. But given his history, I think there will be a risk if he went out without any legal structure
around him. Also, I think he is getting restless and very frustrated, although he is not trying to abscond
at this point in time. Once he realises he could leave, I am not sure that he would stay and he may make
his way to his sister’s and cause problems there. Psychiatrist, pair 17
Practitioners’ perceptions that they had no other option are also evident in their use of the
terminology of constraint. 
It’s difficult to place people with this sort of history and his combination of needs. So I feel my hands
are tied really ....renewal on a section 3, but I would welcome him appealing against it. It’s one of those
sections where I feel unhappy about it. Psychiatrist, pair 17
This perception can be self-constructed (and indeed, in the research, it was evident that other
practitioners given exactly the same factual situation did feel that there were other options). But,
the ready availability of community treatment is likely to prove popular amongst some
practitioners, at least in the first instance. And once community treatment is in place successfully,
the conditions under which it might be deemed unnecessary become even harder to envisage.
Hence, patients and clinicians may become trapped in a coercive relationship akin to the current
arrangements for conditional discharge for restricted patients.
Use of supervised discharge
Using the law as a coercive tool was not without its ethical difficulties, which were acknowledged
by some. Thus, one psychiatrist, who had experience of successfully maintaining three psychotic
young men on s.25A in the community, recognised that using supervised discharged raised an
ethical dilemma.
I think the trouble with it is the lack of ethics around being completely open with people about what it
actually means. To be perfectly honest, this section 25 is a piece of paper and it means nothing. You say
‘these are the conditions, do you agree to them?’ Well they say ‘alright then’ and I am going to renew it
and I have renewed all three of them and it has worked and they have perceived a legal framework,
and it is dodgy, I think morally dodgy but in the end, this is an end that justifies the means. They stayed
15 R v Barking Havering and Brentwood Community Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] 1 FLR 106, R (on the application of
DR) v Mersey Care NHS Trust (2002) Times October 11 2002, and CS v MHRT [2004] EWHC 2958 (Admin)
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out of hospital, they stayed well and they are starting to work and doing all sorts of things.
Psychiatrist, pair 14
However, the dilemma for this psychiatrist was acute for, when challenged about whether he told
his patients that medication could not be enforced in the community, he responded:
Yes...and I told them the truth, obviously in a sort of whisper.
Under the Draft Bill’s proposals the dilemma is somewhat different. The clear expectation is that
compulsion will not be used in a patient’s home, but that transport to an appropriate facility will
be required. However, when a patient is faced with the choice of transport plus compulsion, or
immediate ‘compulsion’ in the privacy of their own home, how many are likely eventually to
concede?
Substantial vs significant: what is the difference?
The Draft Bill employs a great deal of subjective language; uncertainty will necessarily accompany
its use. However, there is a further problem; namely, that language of particular significance to
lawyers does not necessarily have the same significance to non-lawyers. Thus, the Draft Bill uses
the words ‘substantial risk of serious harm’. At face value substantial seems to imply more than
significant. But to the participants in the research the relationship between these two terms was
variable and often obscure.
I think because I’m hesitating, I can’t think of a good reason why it’s different, I think it probably means
the same. Psychiatrist, pair 40
Some felt the terms were interchangeable; others rated a substantial risk as low as a 10% chance of
the predicted event occurring during the six months period of the s.3; and some as high as 70%.
There was, therefore, considerable tolerance in use of terms. 
For whose benefit?
There was also evidence that some practitioners were prepared to use the law to protect themselves,
by adapting a clinical opinion in order to fit the Act. One has considerable sympathy with a
practitioner’s preparedness to do this, particularly when confronted by a perceived risk or where it
enables a practitioner to pursue what are regarded as actions in the best interests of a patient. Thus:
... pragmatically, if it gets me to the position where I have him on a section 3, then I can work towards
the supervised discharge and try him out in a hostel. I would rather be in that position, than let him go.
Psychiatrist, pair 35 
But what lay behind this was only occasionally revealed. For in one case there was an honest
admission that this strategy of manipulating the 1983 Act was not in order to achieve the objective
the psychiatrist had earlier claimed, namely to prevent the patient from relapsing and returning to
Broadmoor Special Hospital, but rather:
It’s really there for our protection, I think. I think the Mental Health Act is there for the protection of
patients, but it is very obviously there for the protection of medical practitioners as well. I admit that. 
I think that your personal experience exposes you to the crucifixion of other doctors; there was a major
incident where they allowed a schizophrenic chap to go home, he stabbed his sister-in-law to death, two
years ago. It made the front page of the Yorkshire press. As a result, you can feel them breathing down
your neck. It does change your view. Psychiatrist, pair 35
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Self-protective strategies were evident in the thinking of other practitioners. For example, in pair
30 the ASW argued for s.25A and wanted to place the patient, Mr Wright, on the local supervision
register; the psychiatrist revealed that nothing could convince her that Mr Wright was ‘safe’ and so
she wished to use renewal under the Act as a form of desensitization for herself. As she stated 
He hasn’t had a structured pattern of leave or been integrated into the community with supervised
leaves. And just to expect him to go straight from the hospital to the community...it’s really nerve
wracking. In fact, I wouldn’t do it. Psychiatrist, pair 30
On being confident that you have reached the right clinical decision?
The SOAD in pair 6 was concerned that there was no way of being certain whether other SOADs
would agree with the proposed course of action.
Just like most consultants act autonomously, where you don’t really know what your colleagues are doing,
likewise with SOADs. SOADs act by themselves. We get together for training days and we might let off
steam about how difficult it is to arrange second opinions and all sorts of mechanics but I don’t know
if we actually discuss ethics............ we’re asked to give an opinion on somebody else’s treatment plan
and there has to be a line between what is acceptable and what is unacceptable. SOAD, pair 6
The Draft Bill proposes establishing new expert panels. Quite how these will operate is not clear.
Indeed, will there be training for them together with all of that necessary for the new tribunal
members? How are standards to be achieved? How are expert panel members to feel supported in
their decision-making?
Or the right legal decision?
Whilst the Draft Mental Health Bill 2004 makes no reference to advance directives, the Mental
Capacity Bill 2004 does. It is therefore entirely possible that practitioners will have to deal with
complex situations where advance directives are in place, but their legal effect under the 1983 Act
is unclear. Under the current arrangements practitioners have enough problems knowing how to
deal with the conflicting views of relatives and a patient about a patient’s (non-binding) advance
directive. Thus:
the whole thing with this one is a real minefield, but I would want to approach them separately just to
check out that she really was competent when she made the advance directive and ask them what they
want me to do. I’m afraid these days, more and more you’re thinking, how is this going to look in court?
What is this going to look like at the inquest, if you take the worst-case scenario? What is the coroner
going to say, when I say to the coroner ‘yes, I let her down’? SOAD, pair 11
The desire to share the responsibility for these difficult decisions was evident.
I’m very hesitant on this because I don’t know what I would really do. In reality I may well say I would
rather have somebody else participate in the decision or take the decision, and say go ahead, do this.
RMO, pair 11 
I believe I ought to respect the advance directive but would find it extremely difficult to do so and I
would probably try to park the responsibility with the SOAD. RMO, pair 13
To which the SOAD responded: 
To be honest with you, I would phone the Mental Health Act Commission and try to chew it over with
somebody legal, as I am honestly not sure of the position. SOAD, pair 13
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All of this implies some confusion about the operation of the current Act, a statute that has been
in force for over 20 years. Quite how practitioners will cope with the demands of the new
legislation is not clear. The Royal College of Psychiatrists already anticipate that psychiatry will
become an even more difficult discipline in which to fill the necessary consultant posts.16 But what
is clear is that to many practitioners the law was a foreign land and certainly an unfamiliar language.
But curiously, it largely did not seem to matter. The question that was uppermost in the minds of
these practitioners was not whether their decisions were lawful or unlawful, but rather whether
they were the right decisions in all the circumstances. And being right might entail right for the
patient now, or it might entail right for the practitioner, or it might entail right with a prospective
view of hindsight. But all these possibilities would suggest a creative and defensive application of
the legal tools available. On the basis of this platform of current knowledge about decision-
making, I remain unconvinced of the government’s assertion that the use of compulsion would
not increase were the Draft Mental Health Bill to be enacted in its current form.
2. The Process: Who Makes Decisions with Whom?
Two issues will be addressed here: those relating to group decision-making and those relating to
multi-disciplinary decision-making.
Group decision-making – are two or more heads better than one or just different?
Too many years ago, when I was a PhD student looking at the decision-making of Mental Health
Review Tribunal (MHRT) members under the 1959 Mental Health Act, there was much discussion
about whether groups made riskier decisions than individuals (this was known as the ‘risky-shift’
phenomena).17 However, during my research it became apparent to me that the process was subtler
than the name implied; in practice, what seemed to occur was that groups made more extreme
decisions than a consensus model of decision-making might suggest. Thus, group decision-making
seemed to result in decisions that were either more risky than their individual members would have
tolerated or more cautious. And in my research it was evident that the tripartite structure for
MHRT decisions was resulting in decisions that were generally more cautious than the individual
members would have made had the decision been one for them to make alone.
This phenomenon could also be observed in the Decisions and Dilemmas research.18 For example,
in the decision about discharge in the case of Mr Wright, 63% of the 80 psychiatrists and ASWs
who looked at the case individually would not have renewed his section. But when the decision was
then made in pairs, 58% of the pairs ultimately favoured renewal, the more cautious strategy for
the management of this case. What had occurred between the individual decision and the paired
decisions to bring about this remarkable change of heart? Was it that the individuals favouring
renewal always had the more persuasive arguments, or that they were in a position to override
anyone favouring not renewing? Intuitively, one would have expected the psychiatrists to have been
16 See, for example, the evidence of the Royal College of
Psychiatrists to the JSC (DMH 24 at p.27), and from
the Department of Health (DMH 404) Resources and
the Regulatory Impact Assessment which notes at paras
20–21 that vacancy rates in 2004 for psychiatrists
exceeded those for other medical and dental groups
(9.6% compared with 4.3%) and that this differential
had increased since 1996. 
17 See Peay (1980) A Study of Individual Approaches to
Decision-Making under the Mental Health Act 1959,
unpublished PhD thesis submitted to the Department of
Psychology, University of Birmingham and Peay 1981,
1989 above
18 See Peay 2003 above
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dominant in this decision, since in law the discretion to renew lies exclusively with the Responsible
Medical Officer (RMO). Yet tellingly, in all the 6 cases where the ASW’s view prevailed (a counter-
intuitive finding) the ASW was arguing for a more cautious strategy than the RMO; and in four of
those cases the ASW favoured renewal, where initially the RMO would not have renewed. Thus,
there was a shift to caution where the decision was made in pairs. What this seemed to imply is
that the use of compulsion under the current Act may be facilitated by the method by which
decisions are made. Two heads are different than one.
Under the arrangements proposed for the Draft Bill 2004,19 individual practitioners will have to
make the decision as to whether a person should be admitted under compulsion for assessment
and then justify those decisions in writing. Three practitioners will be required (in non-emergency
situations) to authorise compulsion. If any one practitioner decides against the use of compulsion
the process of moving towards assessment under compulsion will be stopped. At first sight, this
may imply a welcome pressure against the unnecessary use of compulsion. However, in practice, it
is possible that practitioners will quickly gain a reputation in respect of their compulsion-
mindedness. And that professionals will find themselves teaming up for assessments with others
of a like mind, thereby undermining the structural ‘reverse pressure’. Alternatively, if one
practitioner ultimately says no to compulsion where two others have already endorsed its use, will
the process be re-commenced but with a replacement third party being nominated to undertake the
assessment? Whilst this may be an overly cynical assessment, there is evidence from the research
(see below) that practitioners are aware of their own and others ‘track-records’ and moderate their
behaviour accordingly. Thus, heads sequentially structured may make a difference, or they may
not.
Multi or duo-disciplinary decision-making
A great deal has been written about whether it is possible for different disciplines, such as law and
psychiatry, to talk to one another in a meaningful fashion. I do not intend, indeed I am not
qualified, to explore the finer points of autopoietic theory here.20 However, an albeit crude analysis
of its central tenets does provide an insight into what may be happening when decisions are made
in a multi-disciplinary context. 
Autopoietic theory propounds that the law (and presumably other disciplines like medicine) is an
autonomous system whose operations are self-referential and closed: the law thus deals in
specialised communications which have different meanings from those of other closed systems, for
example, medicine. Yet, the multi-disciplinary nature of decision-making under mental health law,
whether it is by MHRTs (entailing lawyers, doctors and lay people) or by the duo-disciplinary
decision-making entailed in the decision to admit a patient to compulsion, is predicated on
effective shared communications between different disciplines. Evidence of the ability of different
disciplines to communicate effectively with one another is mixed,21 but there is some evidence
19 See clauses 15–18
20 M. King and A. Schutz (1994) ‘The Ambitious
Modesty of Niklas Luhmann’ Journal of Law and
Society 21, 3, 261–87. And for a helpful analysis by
G. Teubner, R. Nobles and D. Schiff (2002) ‘The
Autonomy of Law: An Introduction to Legal
Autopoiesis’, in J. Penner, D. Schiff and R. Nobles,
Jurisprudence and Legal Theory: Commentary and
Materials London: Butterworths.
21 See for example, M. King and C. Piper (1995) How
the Law Thinks About Children Aldershot: Arena;
and R. Nobles and D. Schiff (2004) ‘A Story of
Miscarriage: Law in the Media’ Journal of Law and
Society 31, 2, 221–224.
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from a fascinating observational study of the role of doctors on MHRTs that doctors can and do
act in the role of ‘translators’ when moving between clinical and legal issues.22
Autopoiesis does not state that effective communication can never occur between functionally
different worlds. Indeed, the theory provides a more complex understanding of what comes within
‘effective communication’ through the concept of structural coupling. This concept describes a
potential process for facilitating relationships between different social domains. The key, as
Teubner and his colleagues observe, to successful structural coupling ‘lies in unlocking a hidden
agenda toward compatibility between different worlds’;23 and this in turn entails the ‘processes of
“creative misunderstanding”’.24 This concept will be returned to below, but suffice it to say at this
stage, it is possible that under current legislation the unstated concept of best interests may fulfil
this role, thereby enabling effective communication to occur between doctors and ASWs.
However, another possibility exists; namely, that the true nature of multi-disciplinary decision-
making is not multi-disciplinary at all; one discipline, for whatever reason in the particular context,
simply trumps. During the research it was evident that on a number of occasions either ASWs or
psychiatrists (but usually the former) were prepared to defer to the other professional, seemingly
against their better judgement, on the basis of what was perceived to be privileged knowledge.25
Thus, in a number of pairs either the notion of clinical risk or that of risk to others would cause
the ASW to defer to a psychiatrist who was promoting a more cautious strategy than the ASW
would have preferred (that is either to admit under compulsion to treatment, or to renew a section
in the case of a patient who was already detained). 
The conventional role of the ASW in the decision to admit a patient has historically been seen as
one of potentially acting as a brake on an otherwise overenthusiastic psychiatrist employing a
decision-making approach dominated by the medical model; ASWs are thus able to offer a
different context for decision-making and, in an ideal world, provide alternatives to mere resort to
compulsion in hospital. And there was evidence in the research to support the notion that ASWs
could be effective in this role. For, of the 40 paired decisions about whether to admit Mr Draper,
22 were cases where the ASW’s views prevailed, in 9 the psychiatrist prevailed and in 9 the decision
was evenly balanced. These numbers are in marked contrast to those in the decision to discharge
where exactly the same pairs considered the case of Mr Wright, but here in 22 pairs the psychiatrist
dominated the decision outcome, in 6 the ASW prevailed and in the remaining 12 pairs neither
party dominated the outcome. The evidence is therefore that where the law favours one discipline
over another (and in the decision to admit the compulsion cannot be used unless the ASW is
prepared to ‘sign the pink forms’, whereas in the decision to renew, the statutory responsibility
falls to the RMO) that party can dominate in the decision-outcome irrespective, arguably, of the
persuasive value or legitimacy of their arguments.
As interestingly, it is possible to use the data to look at the influence that individuals have
irrespective of their professionally privileged position. This is a topic of some importance where
22 See G. Richardson and R. Machin (2000) ‘Doctors on
tribunals: A confusion of roles’ British Journal of
Psychiatry 176, 110–115 at p114. 
23 Teubner et al (2002) above at 914–915
24 Ibid. at 915
25 One of the advantages of the research design was that
it was possible to look not only at which professional in
each group dominated the decision-making, in the light
of knowledge as to their preferred individual strategy,
but to look also at whether the law privileged one
professional over another in respect of either the
decision to admit or the decision to discharge. This
would not be possible merely by observing real-life
decision-making where individual decisions do not
currently have to be pre-stated.
54
Journal of Mental Health Law May 2005
individuals make decisions with or alongside other individuals with whom they already have a
decision-making track record. Two matters are of note. First, even over the course of two decisions
involving the same pairs of decision-makers it was possible to observe the consequences of a past
interaction: some individuals, who had failed to operate effectively in the first paired decision,
approached the second in a more measured fashion, whilst others appeared more combative.
Independence of mind can be moderated both by the knowledge of past interactions and by the
prospect of future ones. Second, some individuals were just more dominant than others. In nine
of the pairs one party dominated both decisions irrespective of their statutory role: thus, six
psychiatrists and three ASWs were dominant in both the case of admission and of discharge. 
In 11 pairs the decision-making followed the statutory pattern (that is, the ASW dominated
admission; the psychiatrist dominated discharge); in one case, this pattern was reversed, and for the
remaining 19 cases there appeared to be reasonable agreement between the pairs. So, in some pairs
the law has an influence through its allocation of statutory roles, but in others, individuals trump
seemingly regardless of any structure the law might have tried to impose.
All of this leads me to be somewhat cautious in making predictions as to how the new tripartite,
but sequential, model for the decision to admit under compulsion for assessment will function.
What I feel I can be confident about is that there will be unanticipated perturbations in the process. 
3. Miscellaneous (and Concluding) Observations
Decision-avoidance
You don’t need to do research to know that there are some decisions that we all try to avoid
making and that some people are more indecisive than others. So it is no revelation that there was
evidence in the research that some of the paired decision-making was dominated by a seeming
desire not to have to make a decision at all: this could entail a hunt for more or better information,
a decision to delay taking any further action until some designated future point, or to admit a
patient informally on the basis that this deferred the current problem to a different context. On
questioning, a number of ASWs who did night-time or week-end rotas also reported a tendency
for other practitioners to delay a case until it fell into the purview of the out-of-hours practitioners,
in essence passing the buck to them. In respect of the Draft Mental Health Bill 2004, it might be
argued that it will be more difficult to engage in these strategies and avoid making decisions since
the Bill is generally much more prescriptive than the 1983 Act, requiring explanations of inaction
as well as action.26
The new kid on the block
There was also in the research a curious fascination with all things new, as if somehow these might
be the solution to long-standing problems. For example, there was considerable discussion of the
potential role of s.25a (supervised discharge) in Mr Wright’s case (even though he would probably
not have satisfied the criteria for this section).27 The notion that supervised discharge could give
practitioners some additional control over a patient in the community was attractive. Yet, s.25a is
26 For example, under clause 15(3) where the decision is
made to assess the patient in the community, rather
than to detain, the practitioner is required to specify
the conditions to protect the patient’s health or safety or
that of others thought to be at risk of harm; and clause
38, where there is a duty on the clinical supervisor to
apply to the tribunal where the relevant conditions are
met. 
27 Introduced in 1995 as an amendment to the Mental
Health Act 1983.
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arguably a section with few, if any, teeth; treatment cannot be given under compulsion in the
community even on this section. Indeed, the section is not dissimilar to the long-standing option
of guardianship. Yet that provision was almost never mentioned during the research. Thus, if
compulsory treatment in the community is introduced as outlined in the new Draft Bill, it may
prove popular partly because of its very newness.28
Context – training and experience
How decisions get made about any individual case will be influenced by a host of factors unrelated
to the law: for example, a practitioner’s experience and case-load, the resources available, the
objectives being pursued by any one practitioner, the climate of opinion, and/or an individual’s
ability to tolerate risk and uncertainty. One striking example from the research will suffice: of the
40 psychiatrists drawn from across the country who reviewed the case of Mr Draper, 30 of them
would have admitted him under compulsion had the decision been one for them to take alone. 
Of the 20 psychiatrists with a forensic background from the Institute of Psychiatry who reviewed
the same case, none of them would have admitted Mr Draper. He was, to them a ‘soft case’.29
Similarly ASWs with a large forensic load seemed much more tolerant of potential risk than did
newly qualified s.12(2) psychiatrists with no forensic patients. Undoubtedly, the new arrangements
under the Draft Bill will both extend responsibilities to new practitioner groups (psychologists if
acting as clinical supervisors, and others who qualify as approved mental health professionals) and
draw in more practitioners per se under the expanding boundaries of compulsion under the Act.30
All of these people will require training.31 Maintaining consistency is likely to be problematic, which
in itself is unlikely to help address one current and very real concern with the use of the current
Act; namely, its inconsistent use and its seeming over use with some ethnic minority groups.32
Cognitive errors
The study of cognitive errors is a subject in its own right. Again, suffice it here to say that these
are relatively enduring features of decision-making that will bedevil any attempt to impose a new
regime in decision-making in mental health law with a view to achieving specified objectives.
Subjects such as frame constriction, the single option fallacy, over-confidence and ignoring your
track record all have a part to play.33
28 The Draft Bill does not mention community treatment
orders as such since the Bill envisages a seamless
transition from treatment in hospital to treatment the
community; however, evidence to the JSC, see above,
was replete with discussion of the disadvantages (and
advantages) of having a power to treat under
compulsion outside hospital. 
29 See Peay 2003 at 159
30 See also J. Peay, C. Roberts, and N. Eastman (2001),
‘Legal Knowledge of Mental Health Professionals:
Report of a National Survey’, Journal of Mental
Health Law 44–55.
31 See, for example, the submission of the Regional
Chairman to the JSC where it is asserted that it would
take approximately nine years to complete the interview
processes alone for the appointment of all the necessary
new tribunal members (DMH 200 at para 9).
32 See Department of Health (2005) Delivering race
equality in mental health care: an action plan for
reform inside and outside services and the
Government’s response to the Independent inquiry into
the death of David Bennett (Available on the DoH
web site: 11th January 2005) 
33 See, for example, A. Bartlett and L. Phillips (1999)
‘Decision Making and Mental Health Law’ in
Eastman N and Peay J. (eds) Law Without
Enforcement: Integrating Mental Health and Justice.
Oxford: Hart Publishing; Peay, J. (1999), ‘Thinking
Horses not Zebras’, in Webb, D. and Harris, R. (eds.),
Managing People Nobody Owns London: Routledge.
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Best interests: the autopoietic solution? 
Whilst the concept of best interests clearly has a defining role to play in the Mental Capacity Act
2005, its role under the Mental Health Act 1983 is limited and it is much more limited under the
Draft Mental Health Bill 2004. Yet, when practitioners were asked how they defined their own
roles under the 1983 Act it was clearly a key concept. Coming from a clinical perspective this is
entirely understandable. It is also perhaps not so surprising that some ASWs also saw this
approach as being more relevant to their work than a legalistic approach or an autonomy-based
ethical approach. It would therefore probably be unwise to assume that its practical centrality will
be downgraded in terms of the application of any new Mental Health Act, particularly in the
absence of clear defining principles on the face of the statute; as currently drafted, the 2004 Bill
would assign its limited principles to a Code of Practice and then permit those principles to be
disapplied, for example, where ‘inappropriate or impracticable’.34
Whether clinicians, ASWs and indeed lawyers mean the same thing when they assert that their
decisions are based on the principles of ‘best interests’ is a moot point. However, from the
perspective of autopoietic theory, its very malleability and lack of agreed definition may make the
concept of ‘best interests’ hugely useful to facilitating communication. Creatively
misunderstanding precisely what is meant when both psychiatrists and ASWs strive to achieve
what they (differentially) believe to be in a patient’s best interests may facilitate ultimate
‘agreement’ between these different disciplines involved in the application mental health law. In
short, the paternalistic form of best interests arguably provides the invisible mortar that keeps the
edifice of the 1983 Act in place. For, if autopoietic theory is correct and one discipline cannot
speak meaningfully to another, then having a creative misunderstanding based on a term that has
meaning in all three disciplines (psychiatry, social work and law), even if not necessarily the same
meaning, may permit the impossibilities of accurate translation to be at least partially obviated. 
But autopoietic theory also provides an avenue to think about how such creative
misunderstandings can lead to newly invented opportunities for co-ordinated action.35
If practitioners are prepared to adhere to a self-defining regime that may not wholly reflect what is
on the face of a statute, it is possible that as mental health becomes increasingly to be seen as on a
par with physical health, that practitioners will reach for a newly invented understanding of best
interests. This version of best interests, already present in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in a
nascent form, may be one that requires clinicians to respect what a patient determines is in their
interests, where that patient retains capacity.36 Thus, autonomy-based best interests rather than
paternalism-based best interests may serve to ameliorate what might otherwise be the less attractive
features of the proposed new legislation. If so, then multi-disciplinary decision-making based on
a creative misunderstanding may revive the justification for a several-headed approach to mental
health law.
34 Clause 1(4)(a)
35 See Teubner at al 2002 above at 915 
36 See S.4
